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Introduction1
European Union (EU) assistance in general and to Central 
Asia in particular is a complicated, many sided and fairly 
opaque  business.  In  2007,  a  few  months  prior  to  the 
Council’s approval of an EU Strategy for Central Asia under 
the German Presidency,2 the Commission also presented 
two documents: an overarching Regional Strategy Paper 
for assistance to Central Asia over the period 2007–13 
(RSP)3 and a more detailed and programme-orientated 
Central Asia Indicative Programme (IP), from 2007 until 
2010.4 Over a seven-year period, 719 million Euros were 
to be set aside for assistance to the region through the 
new EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). In 
addition, the EU has allocated more modest funds through 
global  thematic  instruments.  Meanwhile,  the  European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
more recently the European Investment Bank (EIB) are 
stepping up activity in Central Asia and several member 
states have their own assistance programmes (foremost 
Germany) that are likely to match the DCI amount. 
In February 2009, the Commission started reviewing the 
RSP and drafting a new IP for the period 2011–2013. The 
review is being undertaken over the course of 2009 on the 
basis of extensive consultations in Brussels, involving the 
member states and the relevant Commission services, and 
governments and civil society in the region. The mid-term 
review (MTR) is a labour intensive and timely process, 
but it offers the opportunity to strengthen EU assistance 
efforts  against  a  background  of  developing  EU-Central 
Asia  relations  and  significant  external  developments 
affecting the region. 
Not least of these developments, which might be reflected 
in  the  revised  assistance  documents,  are  those  owing 
to  the  implementation  of  the  Council’s  EU  Strategy  for 
Central Asia.  First,  the  increased  number  of  high-level 
visits  since  the  inception  of  the  strategy  should  have 
prepared the ground for a more practical and ‘hands on’ 
approach over the coming years. Second, the EU will be in 
1   The authors would like to thank Michael Emerson, EUCAM 
co-chair, and Aigerim Duimagambetova, EUCAM coordinator at 
CEPS, Brussels, for their advice and input into this working paper. 
Some of the information and views included in this document 
stem from interviews with EU Commission officials in Brussels 
and in Central Asia, February–December, 2009. 
2   The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, 
June 2007, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/librairie/PDF/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf 
3    European  Community  Regional  Strategy  Paper  for 
assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–13, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/07_13_
en.pdf 
4   Central Asia Indicative Programme 2007–10, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/
nip_07_10_en.pdf 
a better position to implement its assistance programmes 
due  to  its  planned  increased  presence  in  Kyrgyzstan 
and  Tajikistan,  where  the  Commission  will  upgrade  its 
technical assistance offices into fully-fledged delegations. 
The presence of EU officials and experts on the ground is 
crucial to assess local proposals and projects and to work 
closely with other donors. Third, EU efforts to normalise 
relations  with  Turkmenistan  through  a  Memorandum 
of  Understanding  (MoU)  signed  on  energy  and  the 
ratification of an interim trade agreement with Ashgabat 
are  part  of  a  growing  engagement  in  that  country  that 
should be reflected in assistance. With the perspective of 
Turkmen gas imports moving closer – even if according 
to some accounts not yet a realistically viable prospect5 
– technical assistance, particularly with regard to revenue 
transparency and management, would connect well with 
the political effort.
In  addition,  a  series  of  important  developments  in  the 
international  and  regional  contexts  over  the  last  two 
and a half years are likely to affect the EU-Central Asia 
relationship at the level of programming assistance. Most 
visibly, the Georgia-Russia war of August 2008, as well 
as the standoff between Russia and Ukraine over energy 
supplies, brings the question of energy relations to the 
fore. Here the EU will work to connect its programming for 
Central Asia to that of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and the new Eastern Partnership (EaP), but also to 
other initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy. Second, 
the global financial and economic crisis has hit Central 
Asia  hard,  especially  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan,  which 
saw a decline in revenues due to decreased opportunities 
for  labour  migrants  working  abroad.  Third,  sharpening 
intra-regional  tensions  due  to  scarce  water  resources 
present  challenges  for  EU  policy  and  programming 
assistance:  Kyrgyz  and  Tajik  water  resources  –  used 
by these countries as the main energy source, and by 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for irrigation 
purposes – have increasingly become a source of tension 
given the lack of capacity to generate energy and obsolete 
irrigation techniques, respectively. Last but by no means 
least, risks of instability in Central Asia are on the rise 
as a result of the war in Afghanistan. The importance of 
Afghanistan will increase over the coming years as will the 
further development of border control through the BOMCA 
programme and anti-drug trafficking through CADAP in 
Central Asia. 
This  EUCAM  working  paper  aims  to  shed  light  on  EU 
assistance to Central Asia as it seeks to confront these 
challenges.  The  first  section  draws  an  overall  picture 
5   See reports by Global Witness, “All that Gas”, November 
2009;  and  Quaker  Council  on  European  Relations,  “The 
Nabucco Gas Pipeline, A chance for the EU to push for change 
in Turkmenistan”, November 2009.EU Assistance to Central Asia: Back to the Drawing Board? - Jos Boonstra & Jacqueline Hale    5
of  EU  assistance  through  mapping  Commission  and 
member states’ funding to the region. The second section 
thematically and geographically examines EU assistance 
priorities  (primarily  through  the  DCI),  addressing  the 
question  of  bilateral  versus  regional  programming. The 
third section focuses critically on the Indicative Programme 
MTR process, through which the EU seeks to recalibrate 
its approach to the region. Finally, we focus on four key 
aspects  of  EU  assistance:  the  use  of  budget  support 
to  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan;  monitoring  of  projects; 
assistance  to  civil  society  organisations;  and  oversight 
of funding through the European Parliament. In short, we 
address the ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of EU assistance to 
the Central Asian republics. The ‘why’ question is beyond 
the  scope  of  this  paper,  but  stands  central  in  many 
other  EUCAM  publications.  The  paper  concludes  with 
recommendations that apply to EU assistance over the 
medium and long terms.
An overview of EU assistance
In  basic  terms,  EU  assistance  to  Central  Asia  is 
shaped  by  the  Commission  documents  drafted  by  the 
Directorate  General  for  External  Relations  (RELEX), 
and is implemented through the EuropeAid Cooperation 
Office  (AIDCO),  the  EU  Delegation  in  Kazakhstan  and 
EU offices in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.6 Until 2006, the 
bulk  of  EU  assistance  for  Central  Asia  was  delivered 
through  the  Technical  Assistance  Programme  to  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). In 2007, 
TACIS  was  replaced  by  the  Development  Cooperation 
Instrument, with a view to establishing a closer connection 
6   For assistance to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan AIDCO in 
Brussels acts as the ‘delegation’.
with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and as 
part of a broader overhaul of EU assistance instruments. 
Accordingly,  emphasis  shifted  slightly  from  the  TACIS 
approach  of  assisting  the  former  Soviet  republics  to 
become full-fledged market economies and democracies 
– in line with the Copenhagen criteria for EU applicants 
–  to  a  DCI  approach  towards  poverty  reduction  and 
sustainable development, while not ignoring democracy, 
good governance, rule of law and human rights. Previously 
agreed TACIS projects have been running since 2007 in 
parallel with DCI assistance, although most TACIS work 
has been concluded by now. 
The instruments
The  DCI  can  be  divided  into  thematic  and  regional 
programmes. In the case of Central Asia, relevant thematic 
programmes  include  the  Food  Security  Programme 
(Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan)  and  the  Non-State  Actor  / 
Local Authorities Programme. Regional programmes are 
in several cases specifically geared towards Central Asia, 
for example the business programme Central Asia Invest; 
the energy programmes INOGATE and TRACECA; the 
broader education programme TEMPUS; and the security-
oriented  programmes  of  BOMCA  (border  control)  and 
CADAP (to combat drug trafficking).
The  DCI  instrument  is  one  of  six  EU  global  financing 
instruments,  of  which  two  others  also  apply  to  Central 
Asia:  the  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Instrument for Stability 
(IfS).  Meanwhile,  where  relevant,  the  DCI  tries  to  link 
up  with  another  financial  instrument,  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which relates 
to Mediterranean, Middle East, East European and South 
Caucasus countries.
The EIDHR, the EU’s specific tool for supporting democracy, 
protecting human rights and funding civil society directly, is 
principally active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
through  a  European  presence  on  the  ground.  EIDHR 
projects  managed  by  the  local  offices  have  included 
those under the country-based support schemes as well 
as  region-wide  thematic  projects,  such  as  a  two-year 
regional  project  on  combating  torture.7  Specifically,  the 
2009 EIDHR Annual Action Programme (AAP) provides 
funding to civil society. In 2009, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
received 600.000 Euros each, while 900.000 Euros were 
allocated to Tajikistan in 2008. The latter did not receive 
funding in 2009, but another 900.000 Euros are envisaged 
for 2010. Projects in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 
either  non-existent  or  very  limited  in  size  and  scope, 
7    Project  implemented  by  Freedom  House  and  partners,  see  http://
www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=233:torture-in-central-asia&catid=37&Itemid=125
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and would need to be coordinated through AIDCO and 
RELEX. The 2009 AAP also provides specific funding for 
civil society seminars in all five Central Asian republics 
as part of a 1.5 million euro package for such seminars 
worldwide. The regional rule of law initiative, one of three 
flagship initiatives under the political Strategy for Central 
Asia, was allocated 600.000 Euros in 2009. 
The structure of the EIDHR makes it difficult to quantify its 
assistance to Central Asia in any given year.8 Its annual 
global  budget  is  around  120  million  Euros,  excluding 
financing of election observation missions. Fixed figures 
for individual countries are not available, since funds are 
allocated to five priorities, of which three are global. For 
instance,  civil  society  seminars,  as  well  as  support  to 
human rights dialogue between the EU and its Central 
Asian partners, are financed under priority 3 (support to 
EU guidelines.9 The two priorities that do allocate funds 
to  regions  regard  Central Asia  as  part  of  EIDHR  work 
in Asia as a whole, not as a separate region. However, 
the  website  of  the  EU  Delegation  to  Kazakhstan  does 
offer some indication on amounts for all ongoing EIDHR 
projects that, if tallied, give the following figures:10
EIDHR ongoing projects 
2005-2011 (as of 5 March 
2009)
Number of 
Projects
Amount in Euros
Regional 3 1,020,686
Kazakhstan 16 1,743,552
Kyrgyzstan 16 2,895,763
Tajikistan 19 3,481,018
TOTAL 54 9,141,019
The Instrument for Stability is less actively used in Central 
Asia. Most noteworthy is the fact that BOMCA and CADAP 
are not financed through the IfS, but through DCI.11 There 
is a question as to whether it would make sense to place 
these  well-received  and  successful  programmes  in  the 
sphere of security and stability in general and security 
sector reform in particular under the IfS umbrella, given 
that it is designed to be a flexible and responsive to short-
8  The EIDHR includes thematic action fiches applicable globally 
(for example, support to the implementation of EU guidelines, 
action against torture, etc.), in addition to country-based support 
schemes.
9  EIDHR  Strategy  Paper  2007–2010;  and Annex  1,  EIDHR 
financial allocations 2007–2010, available at http://www.eu-ngo.
dk/CALLS/EIDHR%20Strategy%2007-10.pdf,  
10  Information retrieved from the website of the EU Commission 
Delegation  to  Kazakhstan,  http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=61&Itemid=39
11  Although in a press release of April 2009 the Commission 
indicated  that  work  on  fighting  WMD  proliferation  and  anti-
trafficking  could  be  consolidated  in  the  former  Soviet  Union 
under  the  Instrument  for  Stability,  see  http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/164 
term  crises  on  the  one  hand,  whilst  working  on  long-
term trans-regional security challenges, on the other. In 
the IfS Indicative Programme 2009–11 only one project 
area takes up Central Asia; ‘fighting organised crime on 
the heroin route: Phase II the Black Sea Basin and the 
Western Balkans’.12 Over three years the IfS planned to 
spend 5–8 million Euros on this programme, of which only 
a small part will reach Central Asian countries’ security 
sectors.  However,  another  substantive  project  is  being 
implemented  in  Kyrgyzstan  in  relation  to  improving 
transparency in the decision-making process and support 
to judicial and constitutional reform.13
The banks
Besides the Commission’s financial instruments, Europe’s 
financial  institutions  also  deliver  assistance  through 
substantial projects in Central Asia. The European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development has been active in 
the Central Asian republics since their independence in 
1991. In Kazakhstan, the EBRD is the largest investor 
outside  of  the  energy  sector,  supporting  the  financial 
sector, businesses and infrastructure projects.14 In 2008, 
EBRD activities in the country totalled approximately thrice 
the value of the Bank’s projects in the other four countries 
and Mongolia combined. In recent years, EBRD policy has 
restricted lending to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan due to 
human rights and governance concerns.15
Central Asia (million Euros)
Country 2007 2008 Cumulative1991-2008
Kazakhstan 532 434 2,090
Kyrgyz Republic 12 12 165
Mongolia 34 51 102
Tajikistan 26 35 96
Turkmenistan 3 10 123
Uzbekistan 15 33 545
Total 621 575 3,119
12  The  Instrument  for  Stability  –  Multi-annual  Indicative 
Programme  2009-2011,  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/
external_relations/ifs/docs/mip_2009_2011_en.pdf 
13  Information  retrieved  from  interviews  with  European 
Commission  officials,  and  http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=324&Itemid=12
5
14  The  EBRD  and  Kazakhstan,  see  http://www.ebrd.com/
country/country/kaza/index.htm 
15  EBRD  Annual  Report  2008,  p.  3,  see  http://www.ebrd.
com/pubs/general/ar08ea.pdf  and  http://www.ebrd.com/about/
strategy/country/uzbe/index.htm;  http://www.ebrd.com/about/
strategy/country/turk/index.htmEU Assistance to Central Asia: Back to the Drawing Board? - Jos Boonstra & Jacqueline Hale    7
The  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  is  a  new  player 
in  Central Asia.  In  2006,  the  Bank  signed  a  MoU  with 
the  EBRD  and  the  Commission  in  order  to  strengthen 
cooperation towards Russia and ENP countries, but also 
with a view to extending EIB activities to Central Asia. 
In November 2008, the European Council agreed to an 
EIB ceiling of 1 billion Euros for Asia as a whole over the 
period 2007–13; for Central Asia, the focus would be on 
energy supply and transport projects.16 Currently, the EIB 
is assessing what investments to undertake in the region. 
Energy with a focus on water resources is a likely sector 
for EBRD-EIB cooperation over the coming years.
The member states
Member states also contribute individually, mainly through 
programmes  and  projects.    The  priorities  correspond 
to the seven main ones established in the political EU 
Strategy for Central Asia. Amounts and project details are 
not available.
Germany  is  by  far  the  most  influential  and  substantial 
European donor in the region. With embassies in all five 
countries and additional offices of the German Technical 
Cooperation  (GTZ),  the  German  Development  Service 
(DED) and the German Development Bank (KfW) in most 
Central  Asian  countries,  Germany  employs  more  staff 
in the region than the EU. German assistance amounts 
to around 60 million Euros a year.17 If Germany were to 
continue this trend, it would spend up to half of the funds 
that  the  Commission  made  available  through  the  DCI 
from 2007 to 2013 (719 million Euros). Close cooperation 
between  the  German  institutions  in  the  region  and  the 
16    European  Investment  Bank,  ‘Russia,  Eastern 
Neighbourhood and Central Asia’, available at http://www.eib.
org/projects/regions/russia/index.htm 
17    Central  Asia  Indicative  Programme  2007–2010,  p.  38, 
available at  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/
rsp/nip_07_10_en.pdf
EU  presence  in  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and Tajikistan 
is  therefore  a  must  if  Europe  and  its  member  states 
want to be seen as a coherent block that offers targeted 
assistance.
Sweden through SIDA and the United Kingdom with DFID 
have  also  been  active  through  several  programmes  in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Unfortunately, DFID appears 
to be scaling down its activities, while Sweden decided 
to close SIDA offices in both countries and stop funding 
new projects. Both donors are likely to play a more active 
role through EU mechanisms. Meanwhile Switzerland as 
a non-EU member has taken a keen interest in Central 
Asia, with an annual amount of around 25 million Euros. 
The Swiss are focussing on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and 
to a lesser extent on Uzbekistan, in the fields of poverty 
reduction, sustainable economic growth (including water 
management issues) and the private sector.
The  three  applicable  EU  Commission  instruments,  the 
two  European  financial  institutions  and  member  states’ 
programmes are the main sources of European assistance 
to Central Asia. These levers of EU assistance are often 
not working in harmony and a stocktaking exercise, as we 
have attempted here, should be a first step in any long-
term  revision  of  the  EU’s  strategy  towards  the  region. 
Some recent innovations, such as the Central Asia Invest 
fund (similar to the Neighbourhood Investment Facility in 
leveraging bank funding from the EU and member states), 
are indicative of a move away from stand-alone projects, 
and have the potential to leverage more flexible, better 
coordinated  and  larger  EU  funds  to  Central Asia  over 
time.18  However,  it  is  clear  that  in  the  medium  to  long 
18    According  to  sources  interviewed  by  the  authors,  this 
programme will have 10 million Euros over 2009–10, but it is 
expected  that  under  the  next  IP  much  more  funding  will  be 
leveraged through EIB, EBRD and member states’ banks.
Priorities/Country KAZ KYR TAJ TUR UZB Regional 
Human rights and 
democracy
BG, SK, SE,
IE, other*
NL, FI, SE, AT,
IE, DE, FR
NL, SE, AT,  UK FR, DE DE,  FR,  NL, 
UK, IE, SE, 
Education
DE, LU, UK
other**
DE, FR, AT,
IT, CY, LV
DE,
other**
RO,  UK, 
FR, DE
DE,  UK,  NL, 
other**
DE, FI, AT, IT
Economic 
Development
DE, SK, IT DE, LV, SE DE, SE,  DE, LU, LV, AT DE, LV, UK
Energy and 
transport
DE, FR, UK DE, CZ DE, FR DE UK
Environment and 
water
FR, SK SE, SK, CZ AT FR, UK, CZ DE, FI
Common threats
FE,  DE,  CZ, 
PL 
FR, LV UK,  FI,  DE, 
IT, IE, LV
NL DE, FR FI,  IT,  UK,  NL, 
DE, CZ, LV
*Preparing Kazakhstan for the OSCE Chairmanship: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Portugal.
** Scholarships by most of the following: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, UK.8  EUCAM Working Paper No. 8
terms the presently disparate EU agents of change will 
need  to  improve  coordination  and  pool  their  resources 
to be able to take the next step in coordinated funding 
and  programming:  namely,  cooperation  with  the  other 
substantial donors in Central Asia – USAID, Japan, the 
United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP),  the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank. 
Where do priorities lie?
The focus of this section lies on the thematic and geographic 
priorities of EU assistance pursued under the DCI as the 
main  source  of  Commission-managed  funding  for  the 
region.  The  Regional  Strategy  Paper  currently  divides 
the  available  assistance  into  three  priority  objectives: 
promotion  of  Central  Asian  regional  cooperation  and 
good neighbourly relations (approximately 30–5 percent 
of the total assistance until now); poverty reduction and 
improving living standards (40–5 percent of); and support 
for good governance and economic reform (20–5 percent) 
–  totalling  an  amount  of  719  million  Euros  over  seven 
years. The current Indicative Programme, in force until 
2010,  divides  314  million  Euros  between  the  regional 
priority and the two bilateral ones as follows:19
Regional Cooperation: 30 % of total resources (2007–10)
Focal sectors
Education •	
Energy •	
Transport •	
Environment •	
Border management •	
Indicative budget (Euros)
25 million (8%)
22 million (7%)
15 million (5%)
16.2 million (5%)
16 million (5%)
Total Regional Central Asia 94.2 million (30%)
Bilateral cooperation: 70% of total resources (2007–10)
National programmes
Kazakhstan •	
Kyrgyzstan •	
Tajikistan •	
Turkmenistan •	
Uzbekistan •	
Indicative budget 
(Euros)
44 million
55 million
66 million
22 million
32.8 million
Of which:
20%
25%
30%
10%
15%
Total Bilateral Central Asia 219.8 million 70%
In reality, RSP policy objectives will be valid until 2013, 
since  the  IP  review  deals  with  the  realignment  of  the 
thematic  focal  sectors  for  the  2011–2013  period.  They 
reflect  an  attempt  to  straddle  the  perceived  need  for 
regional as well as bilateral approaches to the region. The 
first priority, which is regionally oriented, will be maintained 
although  it  has  become  more  apparent  that  there  is  a 
further  need  to  work  on  a  bilateral  basis.  Commission 
officials  do  hope  in  time  to  produce  five  individual 
19   Central Asia Indicative Programme 2007–2010, pp. 4-5, 
op. cit.
Indicative Programmes based on the overarching RSP;20 
either regional priorities and programmes would then be 
highlighted in each of these IPs to the extent that they 
apply to the country, or else a specific ‘regional IP’ would 
need to be drafted. This shift to a predominantly bilateral 
approach makes sense in the context of the Central Asian 
countries. Not only do Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan differ substantially in many 
aspects (culture, population, resources), they also have 
varying  levels  of  interest  in  working  with  the  EU  and 
face different challenges, ranging from tackling extreme 
poverty  in  Tajikistan  to  managing  equitable  economic 
development in Kazakhstan. Importantly, it is unclear the 
extent to which these countries wish to cooperate on a 
regional basis, and in practice the depth and willingness to 
participate in regional programmes varies by sector. The 
states are more or less participating in integrated border 
management (through the BOMCA programme). There is 
some potential in the field of education (Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan already participate in the Bologna process). 
Regional  initiatives  on  other  sectors  are  difficult,  in 
particular  on  water  management,  a  field  in  which  the 
states distrust each other, but also on rule of law, where 
it may be difficult to attract enthusiasm on the part of the 
beneficiaries. 
Nevertheless,  the  political  EU  Strategy  on  Central 
Asia boldly announced that the European Union would 
undertake three specific regional initiatives that are also 
meant  to  link  this  joint  Council-Commission  ‘political’ 
document to the ‘technical assistance’ driven documents 
of the Commission. The Education Initiative, the Rule of 
Law Initiative and the Environment/Water Initiative21 have 
all been launched, but have so far lacked visibility. Except 
for  brief  2-page  prospectuses  and  the  initial  position 
papers (which are closed documents) there seem to be 
no detailed explanatory papers. In this sense, it is unclear 
if they go beyond a coordinating role and if so, if this is 
funded with pledged Commission resources. 
The  other  two  ‘bilateral’  priorities  have  a  clear  logic. 
Poverty reduction should indeed be a main priority in EU 
assistance to Central Asia, foremost in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan where poverty and bad governance could lead to 
instability or state failure. The third priority is a somewhat 
artificial  link  between  good  governance  and  economic 
reform. The EU has chosen to combine these two topics 
to  ensure  that  good  governance  (including  democracy 
and  human  rights)  stays  on  the  agenda  in  talks  and 
20   The current Indicative Programme (2007–10) includes an 
annex that briefly sets out the main priority sectors of assistance 
for each of the five countries. 
21   For explanatory overviews of the three EU Initiatives, see 
the website of the Commission on Central Asia, http://ec.europa.
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projects with the authoritarian partners. Good governance 
is indeed a key aspect in fostering stronger economic links 
between Central Asia and Europe, in the energy sphere 
and elsewhere. These two overarching priorities are also 
further outlined in bilaterally agreed priority papers on a 
country-by-country  basis:  these  short  documents  have 
until now been closed to the public because they also 
outline  what  each  EU  member  state  does  in  terms  of 
projects and funding. Some member states are reluctant 
to share this information, which could lead to unfavourable 
comparisons. Currently, the five priority papers are also 
under revision and are being renegotiated between the 
EU and the Central Asian leaderships. It is unclear the 
extent  to  which  these  priority  papers  are  linked  to  the 
Commission public assistance documents and the logic 
of  the  three  policy  objectives.  It 
would be worth elaborating these 
on paper (and ideally publicly) so 
policy-makers  and  practitioners 
can better identify the synergies 
between  the  various  assistance 
frameworks.  This  would  be  a 
useful step towards streamlining 
assistance policies in the region.
Reviewing  assistance  to 
Central Asia 2011–2013
Although  the  details  of  the 
implementation of the new Indicative Programme itself will 
not be formally elaborated until 2010, the Commission’s 
description  of  the  priorities  largely  corresponds  to  a 
continuity of past programming. The main focus of EU 
assistance to Central Asia will therefore be on technical 
projects  in  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan, 
and budget support in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is 
partly due to an underlying analysis by the Commission 
bureaucracy  that  the  priorities  elaborated  for  2007–10 
are  still  applicable.  Furthermore,  the  Annual  Action 
Programmes – basic operational documents developed 
annually per financing action by AIDCO and identifying 
specific projects to be funded according to the IP as well 
as  their  specific  budgetary  allocations  –  are  only  now 
starting to be implemented. This delay has been to due 
to a time lag in the phase-out and completion of TACIS 
projects. So far, there has been little evaluation of such 
programming. 
Overall assistance amounts are set to increase for the 
2011–2013 period; Tajikistan is the top beneficiary, followed 
by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and finally Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan. The Commission proposes to concentrate on 
three thematic priority areas per country, as well as three 
overarching  priorities  for  the  region:  energy,  water  and 
economic networks; education; and border management 
plus  the  fight  against  drug  trafficking.  For  example,  in 
the  case  of  energy,  water  and  economic  networks  the 
Commission envisages a more integrated approach that 
will give impetus to local small and medium size enterprises 
and  local  governments  by  stimulating  decentralised 
actions  at  the  local  level.  The  proposed  bilateral 
assistance priorities focus on areas such as strengthening 
the judiciary and rule of law (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan);  public  administrative  reform  (Kazakhstan); 
social  protection  (Kyrgyzstan  and Tajikistan);  education 
and/or  human  capacity  development  (Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan);  health  (Tajikistan);  rural  development 
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan); and private 
sector or trade development (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). 
Currently, assistance is thinly spread over a wide landscape 
of  priorities  and  there  is  no  direct  match  with  the  EU 
Strategy for Central Asia. So, what should the focus be? 
As mentioned above, the Commission prefers to retain the 
flexibility of a regional and bilateral mix of priorities in order to 
address overarching needs and concerns alongside more 
tailored bilateral programming. In the field of education 
– which is also a political strategy priority and a regional 
priority through the EU Education Initiative – the proposed 
assistance ranges from extensive support to education 
reforms  in  Kyrgyzstan,  to  a  limited  notion  of  ‘human 
capital development’ involving the training of officials in 
Turkmenistan.  Many  observers,  as  well  as  several  EU 
officials  and  civil  society  representatives,  believe  that 
the EU’s most valued card in assistance and relationship 
building lies in the field of education. There is certainly 
a humanitarian and strategic need given the collapsing 
social infrastructure in Central Asia and poor investment 
in the national education systems, which have to varying 
degrees disintegrated since the end of the Soviet Union. 
It is here that the EU stands to make an impact through 
higher  education  programmes  such  as  TEMPUS  and 
Erasmus Mundus, but also through vocational training for 
experts and officials. Thereby, the European Union could 
differentiate its engagement from several other ‘players’ 
DCI Mid-term Review: bilateral priorities 2011–2013
Kazakhstan
Administrative  capacity-
building
Rule  of  law  and 
judiciary
Regional  development  and 
local governance
Kyrgyzstan Education reform Social protection
Judicial  reform  and  fight 
against corruption
Tajikistan Social protection Health
Private sector Development
Turkmenistan
Rural  development  and 
socio-economic  reforms
Long-term  sustainable 
energy development
Support to the improvement 
of human capital
Uzbekistan
Raising  living  standards 
through  rural  and  local 
development
Support  to  rule  of  law 
reform
Assistance  in  enhancing 
trade,  business  and  SME 
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in the region, especially China and Russia. The EU might 
expand its regional Initiative for Education that currently 
comprises already existing programmes (that also apply 
to many other regions) and develop new programmes and 
projects that tackle the ailing general education systems, 
and thus enhance cooperation with institutions in Europe 
as well as regional cooperation. 
There are important questions regarding the capacity of 
the EU to manage a process where the interest in taking-
up assistance is uneven and where some of the parties 
are  tough  negotiators  and/or  unwilling  partners.22  In 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the request for assistance is 
quite strong while the other (energy-rich) republics have 
been less eager to attract support. In all five countries, the 
bureaucracies think more in terms of EU proposed projects 
and less about the process. The concept of local ownership 
is weak, although the Central Asian states do have clear 
preferences  regarding  the  support  that  is  offered.  For 
instance, good governance projects are not welcomed in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan while political engagement 
is. Kazakhstan made its preference for economic projects 
and education clear in its own strategy for Europe, the 2008 
Path to Europe document.23 Tajikistan has made clear that 
it is especially keen on support for building infrastructure 
to break out of its relative isolation: electricity networks, rail 
and road connections to Afghanistan (and China).24 For 
Kyrgyzstan, budget support and education remain key.
Therefore,  the  European  Commission  finds  itself  in  a 
challenging situation where it must adapt its approaches to 
differing contexts and responses – an approach consonant 
with  the  principles  of  ‘ownership’  and  demand-driven 
assistance espoused under DCI. In the presentations made 
by Commission officials during an April CSO consultation, 
the emphasis was on the need to be responsive to the 
interest of governments rather than ‘imposing’ an agenda 
from outside. Accordingly, the issue of conditionality was 
largely skipped or dismissed as a possibility. Rather, the 
overarching rationale appears to involve ‘engaging’ at all 
costs in order to create linkages that might lead to more 
leverage and thereby fruitful and targeted cooperation in 
the future. In this respect, the Commission is keen to point 
to the constraints – budgetary and in terms of leverage, 
22   Even with regard to the Non-State Actor / Local Authorities 
Programme, where no prior approval from the government is 
required, the governments are pushing hard through cooperation 
committees with the EU to control which NGOs should be the 
beneficiaries. 
23   State Programme Path to Europe 2009–2011, available 
at  http://www.kazembassy.org.uk/path_to_europe_state_
programme.html 
24    It  is  however  unlikely  that  the  EU  will  step  into  large 
infrastructural projects while poverty reduction is more urgent, 
and given that China also is planning transport links through 
Tajikistan.
given that the breakdown of bilateral assistance is only 
in the tens of millions per country per year – on the range 
of assistance the EU can roll out to bring its presence to 
bear in the five Central Asian states and the extent of the 
impact such assistance may have on the ground. 
In  short,  it  seems  that  the  EU’s  focus  on  human 
development  reflects  a  combination  of  a  ‘soft  power’ 
approach in attempting to add value as a normative actor 
in the region, together with a preference for finding ‘soft’ 
entry points (including community development projects 
in  Uzbekistan).  There  are  limitations  to  this  ‘soft-soft’ 
approach however: there is always a danger that the EU, 
perceiving itself to lack leverage in the region, will base 
its negotiations on aid priorities on what governments will 
agree to and sign-off on in terms of financing agreements, 
rather  than  on  the  basis  of  real  development  needs.25 
Such an approach risks lacking a unified strategic vision, 
whilst also undermining the ‘poverty reduction’ objective 
that  underpins  development  cooperation.  For  example, 
in a middle-income country like Turkmenistan assistance 
to  renewable  energy  is  being  pursued,  although  given 
the concerns about the country’s education and health 
sectors  the  need  for  assistance  in  these  is  arguably 
greater.26 Likewise, any attempt to address ‘holistically’ the 
issue of rural development in Uzbekistan – as currently 
proposed by the Commission – which does not directly 
address the issue of forced child labour (with its attendant 
consequences for education and health), as well as the 
related issue of rural adult unemployment, will be unlikely 
to have a transformative impact. 
There are outstanding questions that remain pertinent for 
policy-makers, as well as those closely monitoring the EU 
Central Asia Strategy: where does one set limitations or 
conditions on government-to-government aid in a region 
where  governance  is  authoritarian  and  opaque?  Is  it 
appropriate to provide assistance ‘without strings’ in cases 
where the government is otherwise unwilling to cooperate, 
or where the effects of that assistance could be negligible 
or potentially even counterproductive? Should international 
donors step in to cover the shortfalls where a government 
is failing – through corruption and bad governance – to 
25   The 2008 EIDHR programme to Tajikistan was removed 
because of government opposition despite the fact that for EIDHR 
in  particular  ‘difficult  relationships  with  the  host  government 
should  not  be  a  factor  in  determining  geographical  eligibly’. 
Comments by the Human Rights and Democracy Network on 
EIDHR, December 2008. 
26    Turkmenistan  is  in  need  of  support  to  the  general 
education  sector  in  terms  of  curricular  reform  and  teacher 
training. EU plans focus on ‘human capital development’, likely 
involving officials. See statement of Médecins Sans Frontières 
on leaving the country in December 2009, available at http://
www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=9B9B48C9-
15C5-F00A-25C35A9CCBA3F28D&component=toolkit.
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provide for its citizens? Seasoned observers would point 
to countless training sessions and seminars offered by 
international organisations that have failed to do much to 
support real reforms and have in the past added a veneer 
of legitimacy to institutions such as a national parliament, 
which is in thrall to the President, or to GONGOs. Often this 
has gone without scrutiny (for example by the European 
Parliament) or monitoring on the EU side. Arguing that the 
EU must underpin its strategy by elaborating clear ‘redline’ 
conditions and engaging in greater monitoring and scrutiny 
of outputs is further addressed in the next section where 
we shall take up in greater detail four areas in which EU 
assistance can be strengthened.
Four key issues
Budget support
EU assistance at the global level is moving away from 
project-based  assistance  to  budget  support.  In  the 
Central  Asian  context,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan  have 
been recipients of this kind of support since 1996 through 
the  Food  Security  Programme,  which  has  accounted 
for a total of 102.4 million Euros over the years.27 In the 
case of Kyrgyzstan, there are now plans to support the 
education sector and social protection while in Tajikistan 
the focus is on health. Advocates of budget support see 
it as a litmus test of the efficacy of assistance and as 
‘putting your hands in the fire’ with regard to finding and 
tackling corruption in the system, since with this method, it 
quickly becomes evident if and where there is a problem. 
Officials are overall keen on defending budget support vis-
à-vis project support from the perspective of being able 
to monitor and evaluate progress more clearly. Another 
reason in favour of budget support is national ownership 
and the promotion of regular dialogue with the government. 
However,  the  use  of  budget  support  in  countries  with 
poor records of public accountability and high levels of 
corruption such as those in Central Asia prompts unease 
among observers, particularly following recent scandals 
in Tajikistan regarding misuse of IMF funds. Notably, a 
missing 1 billion dollars is believed to have been diverted 
to  a  private  investment  company,  and  there  has  been 
another case of a state programme intended to prop up 
the agriculture sector, from which a reputed 220 million 
dollars  remains  unaccounted  for.28 This  led  to  calls  for 
closer aid monitoring and for the Tajikistan government to 
be punished.29 
27   EuropeAid, “Evaluation of EC FSP 1996–2006 in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan”, main report, June 2008.
28   See reporting at Radio Free Europe, available at http://
www.rferl.org/content/Tajik_Audit_Reveals_Huge_National_
Bank_Shortfalls/1609233.html
29   ICG, ‘Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure’, Asia Report 162, 
Brussels: International Crisis Group, 12 February 2009.
Commission officials are quick to highlight that its sectoral 
budget support comes with extra safeguards – as opposed 
to general budget support. It enables donors to earmark 
and  track  funds  and  to  attach  further  sector  specific 
performance  indicators  to  the  funds  that  they  monitor. 
Thus,  in  addition  to  three  general  conditions  –  macro-
economic stability oriented policies, positive assessment of 
the public finance management (PFM) system, and sector 
policies – the release of tranches is linked to progress on 
performance  based  indicators:  for  example,  are  social 
expenditures  going  up  or  down?;  how  many  services 
are decentralised?; etc. Furthermore, there is a four-tier 
monitoring system built into the disbursement mechanism, 
so that money is only partially disbursed if conditions are not 
met. Following the scandal involving the national bank of 
Tajikistan, the European Commission, together with DFID, 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank withheld 
budget support to Tajikistan for a year in a concerted and 
coordinated effort to punish the government and enforce 
a change of policy and practice. The IMF was charged 
with monitoring the benchmarks requested by donors.30 
During interviews undertaken for this working paper, some 
officials cited this as a positive example of the leverage 
created by budget support – both in the ability to withhold 
a substantial amount from the state coffers and also to 
use that money to test the government’s ability to manage 
funds – in what amounts to a constant dialogue on PFM. 
Nevertheless, at the time of writing it is not clear which 
benchmarks the Tajik government has met and the reality 
is that donors, including the EU under its 2011–2013 IP 
plans,  are  resuming  budget  support.  Evaluations  also 
reveal that past experiences of EU budget support have 
not  been  a  smooth  process  in  Central Asia,  given  the 
vertical trends in governance and the control exercised 
on whole departments by individual personalities. Internal 
documents reveal that reform measures tend to be short-
term  and  ‘less  than  optimum’.  Despite  intensive  EU 
involvement over a number of years and relatively heavy 
expenditure on a specific sector, evaluations have judged 
the  impact  to  be  minimal  and  reforms  superficial  and 
lacking in sustainability. There are further questions as to 
whether real political leverage is being created or whether 
the  process  of  benchmarking  progress  and  deciding 
to  release  tranches  has  become  hostage  to  a  more 
bureaucratic game being played by both sides. To be able 
to assess whether budget support works in Central Asia 
more evaluations of this kind are needed; these should 
be centrally collated with the findings, synthesised and 
reviewed.
If  there  is  a  case  for  maintaining  budget  support  for 
30   International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it lies in the assumption that 
it is more effective than the alternatives and that the EU 
gains leverage towards these poor countries and willing 
partners to push for necessary reforms – both in the field 
of  public  financial  management  and  beyond.  However, 
the  EU  needs  to  use  this  leverage  to  push  recipient 
governments  to  effect  broader  reforms  and  exercise 
greater accountability – not only to European Commission 
processes, but to their citizens. Support needs to be more 
transparent. First, the idea of governments learning to use 
funds in an effective and transparent manner should be 
exploited to the full by the EU by demanding even stricter 
rules of government reporting through the establishment 
of a joint monitoring group (composed of EU and third 
country  officials)  and,  where  possible,  publication  of 
government accounting reports. The EU can accompany 
its budget support measures by explicitly supporting civil 
society groups to engage in monitoring and scrutiny of 
the supported sector. Second, the EU should be more 
transparent to its own constituencies as to how funds are 
spent and what control is being exercised through regular 
reporting to the European Parliament (EP) and a clear 
policy on the conditions for imposing sanctions, including 
the withholding of such assistance. 
Finally, the EU should make clear that budget support is 
a privileged tool available to governments that are willing 
to undertake reforms and where there is broad agreement 
on the sectors requiring assistance under DCI’s poverty 
reduction rubric. Where one or other of these conditions 
are  absent,  as  in  Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan,  the 
European Union should not extend budget support.
Monitoring of projects
Besides budget support to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the 
DCI (like TACIS previously) provides funds for a substantial 
basket of bilateral and regional projects. The Commission 
systematically prepares monitoring reports on its projects, 
generally at least once a year. A standard grid of criteria 
and ratings is used; the criteria being relevance, efficiency, 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability, with the ratings 
of very good, good, problems and serious deficiencies. 
The monitoring system itself seems to work effectively. 
These reports, some of which we had access to, are not 
published.  However,  for  the  sake  of  transparency  and 
accountability,  it  would  be  interesting  if  a  database  of 
reports were available on the Commission’s website. The 
monitoring reports are commissioned by the Commission’s 
programme managers directly concerned, which implies 
a certain hazard for the monitor, who may be inclined to 
report what the contractor wants. In other organisations 
such as the World Bank the project evaluation function 
is  undertaken  by  a  department  that  is  independent  of 
the operating department. In the EU context, it is worth 
considering whether the monitoring function should not 
be commissioned by, or at least in association with the 
European Parliament. 
Summary of monitoring results for European Commission 
projects in Central Asia
Number 
of 
projects
Number of Projects by Monitoring 
Result/ or Evaluation
Very 
good
Good Problems
Serious
Deficiencies
Central Asia 16 1 41 38 0
Kazakhstan 22 4 71 33 2
Kyrgyzstan  15 2 47 24 2
Tajikistan 29 3 79 60 3
Turkmenistan  4 0 8 10 2
Uzbekistan  17 2 57 25 1
Total 103 12 303 190 10
Relevance  3 67 30 3
Efficiency  3 54 41 5
Effectiveness  3 61 37 2
Impact  2 64 37 0
Sustainability  1 57 45 0
Source: Result-Oriented Monitoring of Projects and 
Programmes financed by EC – Lot 3 (Asia and Central 
Asia), Annual Report 2008.
As regards the substantive ratings, the table above gives 
the results for over 100 projects currently underway. Given 
that there are five marks for each project, this gives around 
500 ratings in total. There is a strong concentration of results 
in  the  two  middle  categories  of  ‘good’  and  ‘problems’, 
with very few ‘excellent’ or ‘disastrous’ ratings. The ‘good’ 
outnumber the ‘problems’ in a ration of roughly 3 to 2. The 
low level of ‘excellent’ results may be disappointing, but 
it is not surprising, since problems are frequent due to 
poor professionalism and endemic corruption in the public 
administrations of the region. The results for Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are more favourable than for 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, or for regional projects. 
EU support to civil society
Local  and  international  civil  society  networks  have  an 
advisory role to play in helping the EU to navigate the at 
times treacherous waters of implementing development 
assistance in Central Asia. The Commission should be 
commended for its efforts to reach out to civil society in 
Europe and Central Asia when discussing a new Indicative 
Programme. Nonetheless, there is a real need for more 
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the region – to build and sustain its capacity to recommend, 
monitor and hold the governments and the donor community 
accountable. It is in the EU’s interest that civil society be 
increasingly involved in such discussions – from the point 
of view of network-building and normative socialisation to 
EU standards and practices – and ultimately to bring in 
a new constituency of actors who can help enhance the 
EU’s own visibility and impact beyond the closed rooms of 
inter-governmental meetings. 
Forging links between European civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and their counterparts in Central Asia is difficult 
due  to  the  absence  of  pre-existing  ties,  and  poor  civil 
society infrastructure in the region. Delivering EU financial 
support to NGOs and other civil groupings seems even 
more challenging. In supporting democracy development 
and  human  rights  the  US  had  a  reputation  of  directly 
assisting civil society organisations, while the EU – due to 
its enlargement process with Central and East European 
countries – favoured support for official democratic and 
judicial institutions. Whilst the EU is giving vital support 
to  international  NGOs  working  on  Central  Asia  whose 
remit is to protect human rights defenders, this support, 
though  critical,  is  not  visible.  However,  some  recent 
developments indicate that in the case of Central Asia 
(and elsewhere) Brussels understands that it also has to 
reach out to local civil society in order to have an impact 
and be recognised as a player. In some Central Asian 
countries,  this  combination  yields  modest  successes 
such as in Tajikistan where government agencies and civil 
society can be found sitting around the table to work on 
joint EU funded projects or where state institutions ask 
NGOs for advice. Civil society seminars offered by the 
EU and funded under EIDHR provide a forum for CSOs 
to engage in the political process through inputting into 
intergovernmental  human  rights  dialogues.  However, 
the link needs to be strengthened if CSOs are to remain 
engaged  in  the  process,  where  necessary  through 
benchmarking and endorsing their recommendations and 
ensuring adequate follow-up, for example through linking 
recommendations to funding or by bringing them to donor 
coordination meetings.
Assistance to civil society in Central Asia consists only of 
a very small part of overall EU assistance. It is provided 
in addition to the 719 million Euros under DCI through 
EU  programmes  such  as  the  European  Instrument  for 
Democracy and Human Rights and the Non-State Actor / 
Local Authorities Programme. Projects are not bilaterally 
agreed  with  governments  and  thus  fall  outside  of  the 
scope of the Indicative Programme. It is however a labour 
intensive part of assistance. In essence, the Commission 
and  Delegation  offices  in  Central  Asia  do  not  have 
sufficient staff to ensure that funds are delivered quickly to 
the right NGOs for worthwhile projects. For example, the 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan offices did not have a financing 
contracts section and had to rely on the office in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan. Without operations sections and staff to do 
political reporting it is almost impossible for the EU to map 
out which civil society organisations to support, as it has 
no sufficient ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ on the ground.31 While the 
Commission in general tends to focus on larger projects 
that would be less work intensive to monitor with limited 
staff available, it understands that bigger is not necessarily 
better in the human rights sphere.
A more coherent approach might be achieved, inter alia, 
through the appointment of a human rights focal point and 
expert in the Delegations involved in IP formulation who 
could ensure complementarily of geographic and thematic 
instruments, such as EIDHR. In addition, it would make 
sense if the EU tried to channel larger annual lump sums 
to organisations that do have the capacity to make good 
judgement on support to grassroots organisations. The 
Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
is an obvious candidate in this sense. Other options are 
working  with  organisations  such  as  the  Open  Society 
Institute or the Aga Khan foundation, both of which have 
expert presence on the ground in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. This should not necessarily mean that the 
EU would lose visibility. Projects would continue to carry 
EU logos.
Another difficulty is the complicated and lengthy procedures 
that NGOs have to go through to obtain EU grants. Some 
Delegation  offices  are  planning  to  train  civil  society 
personnel on how to write proposals and reports, but it still 
remains a daunting task for ill-equipped and inexperienced 
civil society actors. Despite some improvements including 
the ability to submit proposals in the local language, the 
whole bureaucratic process regarding financial accounting 
and reporting may be difficult to change, since European 
taxpayers want to have funds correctly accounted for. To its 
credit, and within the constraints of the financial regulation, 
the European Commission is pushing for clarity on tax 
arrangements to prevent NGOs from being hit by onerous 
tax bills, as recently befell a number of organisations in 
Central Asia.32 
In view of the particularly weak capacity of civil society 
in  the  region,  some  burdensome  requirements  seem 
quite unnecessary and might be scrapped, namely the 
requirement for an NGO to co-finance projects, and the 
complicated restrictions on the origin of procurement of 
31   It should be noted that the EU is planning to upgrade its 
delegations in the region as required by the Central Asia Strategy. 
However, the process so far has been gradual.
32   See Commission Proposal COM (2009) 194, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
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goods  even  for  small  amounts  in  technical  assistance 
projects.  In  practice,  the  Commission  is  more  flexible 
on co-funding and has reportedly proved to be willing to 
fund up to 100 percent in difficult ‘category 1’ countries, 
and nearly 95 percent in some countries. This is not yet 
the norm, though the Commission Delegations have the 
last word in specific cases. Much is therefore left to the 
discretion  of  a  few  overburdened  Commission  staff.  In 
reality, their hands remain tied with respect to flexible grant 
making  (particularly  regarding  the  minimum  threshold) 
with the result that the EU ‘package’, replete with onerous 
administrative  requirements,  remains  unattractive.  Civil 
society representatives in the region generally claim that in 
their experience DFID and USAID procedures were much 
more reasonable than those of the Commission, which has 
the heaviest form among international  donors, although 
these two donors are no less concerned by the need for 
financially correct procedures.
Finally, it is important for Commission and Council officials 
and MEPs to connect more frequently with civil society 
representatives during their visits to Central Asia. 
Assessment and oversight: the role of the European 
Parliament
As a joint authority on EU budget and a direct representative 
of the European taxpayer, the European Parliament has a 
role to play in the democratic scrutiny of EU assistance.  As 
part of the political negotiations with the Council and the 
Commission over the DCI (over which it has co-decision 
powers), the Parliament demanded right of oversight of 
programming  documents  –  including  those  pertaining 
to AAPs that are ordinarily subject to bilateral financing 
agreements between the Commission and the beneficiary 
government  (with  some  scrutiny  by  the  Member  States 
Management  Committee).  Parliamentary  scrutiny,  public 
by nature, could prove useful where proposed funding is 
deemed questionable, as in the case of the 2007 Annual 
Action  Programme  for  Uzbekistan,  which  proposed  to 
provide equipment to the Parliament of Uzbekistan as well 
as to the National Association of NGOs. On that occasion, 
the EP successfully blocked funding. However, there are 
limits to this approach as long as MEPs fail to prioritise 
scrutiny  over  their  legislative  function,  including  policy-
making. As for Uzbekistan, the same funding proposal was 
accepted under the AAP for the following year when the 
EP failed in its due diligence. 
There  is  therefore  a  need  for  the  EP  to  upgrade  its 
response to AAP documents in order to make better use of 
the hard-won right to scrutinise these basic texts, through 
linking the technical work of the thematic working group 
responsible  for  DCI  back  to  a  more  political  process  – 
thereby creating greater incentives for MEPs to commit. 
An annual resolution or report on programming assistance 
specifically to Central Asia would give the scrutiny process 
greater  teeth  and  improve  the  European  Parliament’s 
profile.  It  would  better  leverage  the  many AAPs  which 
are now sent to the EP, but which MEPs see no political 
urgency in scrutinising on an individual basis. This is likely 
to be of increasing importance as the European Parliament 
gains new powers under the Lisbon Treaty. 
Recommendations
As demonstrated earlier, EU assistance to Central Asia 
(and in general) is complex and takes many factors into 
account, ranging from urgent needs (poverty reduction) to 
moral issues (human rights promotion) and to political and 
economic ‘hard’ interests. It would be beyond the scope 
of  this  paper  to  identify  under  each  objective  a  single 
priority where the EU should focus its resources. Still, a 
few broader conclusions can be drawn that lead to the 
following recommendations:
1. The EU should consider focusing programming in fewer 
focal  areas  and  these  should  be  much  more  explicitly 
linked  to  supporting  the  broader  policy  framework.  The 
political strategy – which reads as a broad ‘assistance-plus-
engagement’ exercise as opposed to that of elaborating 
a strategic vision – outlines seven priorities ranging from 
democracy to security and from education to human rights. 
Arguably, it will be impossible to have an impact through 
projects  and  programmes  on  all  seven  fronts  with  the 
little  more  than  719  million  Euros  available  over  seven 
years offered by DCI and other instruments. The ability 
to achieve gains even in these seven ‘building blocks’ is 
further complicated by the mismatch between these and 
other identified programming and policy priorities (namely 
the three flagship initiatives and the regional priorities under 
the RSP). In short, the EU will have to make tough choices 
on where to invest and avoid ‘ticking of assistance boxes’ 
indicated by the strategy. Otherwise, it risks focusing on all 
while achieving very little. 
2. The EU’s greatest asset in terms of assistance for Central 
Asia lies in the field of education. Amid a collapsing social 
infrastructure and poor investment in the sector, it is here 
that the EU can make an impact through higher education 
programmes such as TEMPUS and Erasmus Mundi, but 
also through vocational training for Central Asian experts. 
The European Union will however need to move beyond 
the already existing programmes and develop (within the 
Education  Initiative,  which  is  being  coordinated  by  the 
Commission)  new  projects  and  programmes  that  tackle 
problems  in  the  general  education  system  and  which 
enhance  cooperation  with  Europe  and  at  the  regional 
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3. The EU should further reconsider the balance between 
regional funding and bilateral programmes. On the one 
hand, the five Central Asian republics have quite different 
interests and needs that result in the necessity to work on 
a bilateral basis in most cases. On the other hand, regional 
approaches should not be limited to the five Central Asian 
republics but be interconnected with other countries and 
regions, notably energy questions (with South Caucasus) 
and  border  control  (with Afghanistan  and  Russia).  This 
does not mean that the EU’s regional approach to Central 
Asia should be scrapped. It would however make sense 
first to clarify the position and funding mechanisms for the 
three regional initiatives: environment (water), education, 
and rule of law. Second, the EU would do well to devise 
five separate IPs for each of the countries and one IP solely 
devoted to assistance on a regional basis. The latter could 
outline a grouping of EU flagship projects and engagements 
aimed at all five states with cross-linkages to neighbouring 
countries and regions where the EU is active.
4.  EU  Commission  driven  assistance  in  Brussels  but 
especially  on  the  ground  should  explicitly  seek  to 
coordinate  efforts  with  member  states  and  other 
European countries. In Central Asia, this especially applies 
to  Germany,  which  is  strongly  represented  in  all  five 
countries and has more personnel to implement assistance 
programmes  than  the  Commission.  Swiss  development 
aid ranks high and should also be taken increasingly into 
account through cooperation, coordination and planning. 
At the same time, the Commission is a crucial player and 
a  possible  linchpin  because  bilateral  and  EU  member 
states’ assistance is patchy. Some important EU donors 
are reportedly scaling down and shifting expectations (UK-
-DFID) or moving out all together (Sweden-SIDA). Careful 
EU planning with a view to take over useful projects would 
cut duplication and increase European visibility, and at the 
same time strengthen the image of the EU as a long-term 
committed partner. 
5. Budget support should be maintained for Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan only through explicitly earmarking specific 
sectors each year (as is the case with EU budget support in 
ENPI) rather than contributing to the general state budget. 
Sector specific benchmarks should be attached to budget 
support  as  performance  indicators  on  which  further  aid 
tranches will be conditioned. This should be in addition to 
general conditionality relating to the improvement of public 
procurement and public financial management. Moreover, 
support  needs  to  be  more  transparent.  The  EU  should 
demand stricter rules of government reporting through the 
establishment of a joint monitoring group (composed of EU 
and third country officials). Given the concentration of funds 
involved over time further monitoring of this policy tool by 
the  Commission  is  needed  to  verify  its  efficacy  before 
considering  extending  its  use  to  Central Asia  and  such 
monitoring and evaluation should be centrally collated and 
reviewed. Meanwhile the EU should be more transparent 
to its own constituencies on how funds are spent and what 
control is being exercised, through regular reporting to the 
European Parliament and a clear policy on the conditions 
for imposing sanctions, including the withholding of such 
assistance. 
6.  Whereas  monitoring  of  EU  projects  seems  to  be 
reasonably  effective,  there  is  little  information  available 
on  the  results  achieved.  For  the  sake  of  transparency 
and accountability, the EU should create a database of 
monitoring  reports  and  make  it  available  through  the 
Commission’s website. There is also a case for separating 
project  evaluation  from  project  operations  to  further 
guarantee objective analyses; the EP could potentially fulfil 
a commissioning role. 
  7.  Distribution  of  funds  for  civil  society  should  be 
simplified,  staffing  at  the  delegations  improved  and  in 
some cases outsourced to trusted, experienced and well-
established  third  parties  with  a  strong  presence  on  the 
ground. The Commission should systematically lower the 
co-funding  required  for  financing  projects  and  consider 
lowering  the  minimum  threshold.    Most  importantly,  it 
is  urgently  necessary  to  enhance  staffing  to  enable 
Commission field offices better to cope with the burden 
of  identifying  and  administering  projects.  This  must 
be  built  into  the  planned  delegation  upgrading,  which 
should happen more quickly. This alone would produce 
quantitative  improvements  in  the  management  of  aid 
and prevent situations where the decision not to launch 
an annual country-based call for proposals under EIDHR 
or NSA/LA is based on lack of capacity rather than need. 
A more coherent approach might be achieved, inter alia, 
through the appointment of a human rights focal point and 
expert in the EC Delegations involved in IP formulation who 
could ensure complementarity of geographic and thematic 
instruments, such as EIDHR.
8.  The  European  Parliament  should  strengthen  its 
oversight  role  in  scrutinising  Commission  spending  on 
assistance to Central Asia (and elsewhere). At present, 
after  having  pushed  hard  for  access  to  RSPs,  IPs  and 
AAPs, the EP is punching below its weight in the scrutiny of 
these documents and risks losing credibility in its oversight 
function. The EP should link the work of the thematic working 
groups and its Central Asia inter-parliamentary delegation 
back to a more political process – thereby creating greater 
incentives  for  MEPs  to  commit  to  oversight. An  annual 
resolution or report on programming assistance to Central 
Asia would improve the European Parliament’s profile in 
scrutinising the process and provide better leverage to the 
many AAPs which are now sent to the EP, but which are 
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linked to a full Committee process such a resolution would 
allow MEPs to scrutinise and debate key issues, such as 
those raised in this paper, and begin to elaborate policy 
positions on issues where there are currently lacunae. 
9.  Assistance  is  most  needed  and  most  viable  in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In these countries, the EU 
has  some  leverage  through  its  funds  and  can  actually 
make a positive impact on the persistent dire situation. The 
impact of the economic crisis that might – in combination 
with other security-related factors – destabilise Tajikistan 
should be taken into account with new socially-oriented 
programming. Cooperation between the many international 
donors should be strengthened, especially in the case of 
Tajikistan.
10.  Assistance  allocated  to  energy-rich  and  quickly 
developing Kazakhstan should be confined to education 
and support to civil society. EU relations with Astana should 
not be assistance-driven, but of a political and economic 
nature. Technical assistance could perhaps be provided 
using the USAID example in which Kazakhstan pays for 
services delivered. There is a case for the EU Technical 
Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instrument 
to work with Kazakhstan (and maybe Turkmenistan too) in 
advising on provision of specific assistance without going 
through the EU tendering and contracting procedures.
11. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan should not rank high 
on the assistance list because both are only marginally 
receptive  to  EU  assistance  initiatives  and  their  harsh 
authoritarian nature makes it very difficult to work with. 
As governments that are hesitant to work with the EU and 
unwilling to enact basic reform processes, they should not 
be  rewarded  with  budget  support.  Besides  political  and 
economic engagement, the EU would do well to focus on 
human rights and governance issues through its thematic 
instruments  such  as  the  EIDHR.  For  this  to  work,  a 
presence on the ground that goes beyond a ‘non-political’ 
Europe House is necessary.
Conclusion
The  overall  picture  of  EU  assistance  for  Central  Asia 
resembles more a seventeenth century battle scene than 
a still life. Next to the Commission instruments – primarily 
the DCI and secondly the EIDHR and the Instrument for 
Stability – the activities of member states and the European 
banks should not be disregarded. All these instruments, 
institutions and countries have different views on Central 
Asia as a region and set varying priorities. Moreover, their 
ways of budgeting and assessing assistance also differs 
substantially. Though complicated, European assistance to 
Central Asia is relatively small in scale compared to regions 
that are closer to the EU, such as the Mediterranean and 
Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, all European funds pulled 
together do have the size that gives Europe the opportunity 
of making a positive impact on Central Asian societies and 
creating some leverage, while strengthening its image in 
the region.
The  drafting  of  the  new  Indicative  Programme  (2011–
2013) offers a good opportunity to strengthen assistance 
and bring it in line with the new realities of EU-Central 
Asia  relations. A  country-specific  approach  will  be  vital 
for the EU in spending its limited resources wisely and 
usefully. Meanwhile on a regional level the EU needs to 
re-think if Central Asia, from an assistance point of view, 
is a compact five-country region or if a broader view plus 
stronger bilateral ties might be better. To be effective and 
make an impact the EU seems to need to make choices, as 
it cannot be involved and fund all issues brought together 
in the political strategy. The EU showed vision in 2007 by 
launching a broad political strategy but needs to keep its 
feet on the ground when it comes to spending. There is 
much to do (political opportunities as well as assistance 
challenges).  Now  that  the  EU  is  more  firmly  settled  in 
Central Asia, it will need to go back to the drawing board 
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AAP      Annual Action Programmes
ADB      Asian Development bank
AIDCO     EuropeAid Co-Operation Office
BOMCA    Border Management in Central Asia
CADAP     Central Asia Drug Action Programme
CSO      Civil Society Organisation
EaP      Eastern Partnership
EP       European Parliament
EU      European Union
EBRD      European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB      European Investment Bank
EIDHR      European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EUCAM    EU Central Asia Monitoring project
DCI      Development Cooperation Instrument
DED      Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst 
DFID      Department for International Development
ENP      European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI      European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
GTZ      Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
INOGATE    Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
IP      Indicative Programme
IfS      Instrument for Stability
MDG      Millennium Development Goal
MTR      Mid-term Review 
NGO      Non-governmental Organisation
KfW      Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau 
OSCE      Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFM      Public Financial Management
RELEX     Directorate General for External Relations (Commission)
RSP      Regional Strategy Paper
SIDA      Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TAIEX      Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument 
TEMPUS    Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies
TRACECA    Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
UNDP      United Nations Development Programme
USAID      United States Agency for International Development
WB      World Bank
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Central  Asia  Strategy;  to  strengthen  debate  about  the  EU-
Central Asia relationship and the role of the Strategy in that 
relationship; to enhance accountability through the provision 
of high quality information and analysis; to promote mutual 
understanding by deepening the knowledge within European 
and Central Asian societies about EU policy in the region; and 
to develop ‘critical’ capacity within the EU and Central Asia 
through the establishment of a network that links communities 
concerned with the role of the EU in Central Asia.
EUCAM is sponsored by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and 
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also 
supported by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and 
the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
FRIDE  is  a  think  tank  based  in  Madrid  that  aims  to 
provide original and innovative thinking on Europe’s role 
in the international arena. It strives to break new ground 
in its core research interests – peace and security, human 
rights,  democracy  promotion  and  development  and 
humanitarian aid – and mould debate in governmental 
and nongovernmental bodies through rigorous analysis, 
rooted in the values of justice, equality and democracy.
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and authoritative think tanks operating in the European 
Union today. CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate 
on EU affairs, and its most distinguishing feature lies in 
its strong in-house research capacity, complemented by 
an  extensive  network  of  partner  institutes  throughout 
the world. CEPS aims to carry out state-of-the-art policy 
research  leading  to  solutions  to  the  challenges  facing 
Europe today and to achieve high standards of academic 
excellence  and  maintain  unqualified  independence. 
CEPS  also  provides  a  forum  for  discussion  among  all 
stakeholders in the European policy process and builds 
collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and 
business representatives across the whole of Europe. 
EUCAM • CEPS-Brussels www.ceps.eu • FRIDE-Madrid www.fride.org 
www.eucentralasia.eu